To mitigate climate change, carbon needs to be removed from the atmosphere and stored for thousands of years. Currently, carbon removal and storage are voluntarily procured, and longevity of storage is inconsistently defined and regulated. Clauses can be added to procurement contracts to require long-term management and increase the durability of storage. Well-designed and properly enforced contracts can pave the way to future regulation for long-term carbon management.
This thesis seeks to investigate the use of Artificial Intelligence when reviewing STEM job applications and the human biases that are present in AI system training datasets. Further, it proposes to gender neutralize training dataset terms to evaluate job applications based on merit and qualifications, promoting the inclusivity of women in STEM jobs and seeking to eliminate job application system bias from a Utilitarian perspective.
My honors thesis focuses on the technological aspects and the legal impacts of prosthetics and advanced prosthetics. There is a lot of case law dealing with early prosthetics when it comes to worker’s compensation, airport security, prisons and sports. However, there has been little case law that has dealt with advanced prosthetics. As prosthetic limbs become more technologically advanced and intertwined with one’s identity, it is crucial that laws are made to draw a new line between person and property. The innovation of prosthetic limbs has just begun and will surely face setbacks along the way, but the benefits will be worth it once the law catches up with the rapidly advancing technology.

First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
