In today's business environment, customer service is more critical than ever. It is a major factor when consumers decide where to take their business. However, consumer choice is not applicable to all businesses for example, public utilities. Consumers do not have a choice in picking which utility company provides them service; the choice depends upon local jurisdictions and predetermined service territories. This lack of choice creates a "forced relationship" between consumers and public utilities. Because the nature of this relationship can have a negative impact, public utilities need to reevaluate their approach and invest in effective customer service as a valuable tool to achieve their organizational goals. This study investigates the need for public utilities to expand their investment; explores the available avenues to expand their investment; and offers a recommended pathway with the features and interface to expand their investment. Technology is the key in achieving organizational goals as it can reengineer internal and external operations. Self-service technology (SST) along with the features of gamification enable an organization to reengineer both its internal and its external operations. Companies can shift work from employees to customers and develop new mediums for customer service interaction. Overall, three investments are analyzed: traditional call centers, online, and mobile. The analysis focuses on available features and how those features affect the achievement of organizational goals. Two studies comprise interviews with utility representatives and a customer survey completed to reinforce findings. Based on the research, a smartphone application is the best option to enhance customer service while addressing all organizational goals.

The right to cast a meaningful vote, equal in value to other votes, is a fundamental tenet US elections. Despite the 1964 Supreme Court decision formally establishing the one person, one vote principle as a legal requirement of elections, our democracy consistently falls short of it. With mechanisms including the winner-take-all format in the Electoral College, disproportioned geographic allocation of senators, extreme partisan gerrymandering in the House of Representatives, and first-past-the-post elections, many voters experience severe vote dilution. <br/><br/>In order to legitimize our democratic structures, American elections should be reformed so every person’s vote has equal weight, ensuring that the election outcomes reflect the will of the people. Altering the current election structure to include more proportional structures including rank choice voting and population-based representation, will result in a democracy more compatible with the one person, one vote principle.

Descriptive representation is important to building and maintaining a fair court system, especially within a context of historical oppression by race or gender. Using official government biographies, voter rolls, news articles, and press releases, I collected demographic information on the judges of Arizona and compared it to Census data, to show how under representative the state courts of Arizona currently are. Through the use of non-attorney judges, the Justice Court of Arizona has become the most representative level of the state court. Almost all of the BIPOC judges of the Justice Court are not attorneys. Allowing non-attorney Justices of the Peace has made it possible for the court to be more representative of Arizonans. However, even though it is the most representative state court, the Justice Court vastly under represents women and BIPOC as judges. As racial tension and movements for fairness under the law increase, it is important to challenge how the courts could better serve Arizona.

Previous studies about the effects of regulatory institutions on the outcomes of regulation have resulted in a lack of consensus on the nature of these impacts. This paper seeks to resolve some of this ambiguity by analyzing two dimension of electric utility regulatory outcomes, prices and reliability, with a broader panel of explanatory variables and with a Hausman-Taylor regression technique. The results suggest that elected regulators and deregulated electricity markets result in worse reliability outcomes for consumers without strong evidence that either institution secures lower electricity prices. Incorporating these insights into a theoretical model of regulation could give more detailed insight into how to create regulatory institutions that can optimize the outcomes of governance.